James Hasik

Munitions Mobilized; Next, Do Drones.

I disagree with Josh Rogin’s editorial, in yesterday’s Washington Post, that “Ukraine aid is hanging by a thread.” In contrast, I agree with Byron Callan of Capital Alpha Partners for his observation, in a research note of yesterday, that money and munitions will continue flowing to support the war in the east, “because a majority in DC recognizes the consequences of a Ukrainian defeat for Asia and Europe.” Whatever the fulminations of what Congressman Don Bacon of Nebraska has termed “the dysfunction caucus”, there are far better costs to cut, including in the Defense Department’s budget. Thus, as Callan continues in a research note of earlier today, the current war will remain contest of industries, at which the Russians will struggle in the long run. As Pavel Baev wrote this week, “the old Soviet stocks are exhausted, and current production rates are insufficient.”

I will continue with a further thought. The next big war may be yet more a contest of militaries, and before it starts. Mobilizing old-school munitions production may not suffice. Forces across and beyond NATO need to get more comfortable with unmanned systems, and the marketing arms of the arms industry have a role to play in that.

For my full five-page analysis, including the charts, Download Munitions Mobilized Next Do Drones 20230922.

On Winning a War at Sea, without Ships: Some thinking, on the Ukrainian-not-Navy, Elon Musk, and the potential for naval automation.

September has seemed a pivotal month in the conduct of modern warfare, even if we just focus on the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War. In considering the score of the past two weeks, note that all the Ukrainian work to secure the Black Sea against Russian naval activity has been undertaken without access to a single large ship. The Russians have lost a submarine, but only in port. For many navies, this begs the question, when does a navy actually require surface ships? What radical change would that suggest? In my seven-page note, I analyze that question through the framework of what Elon Musk calls his “algorithm” for breakthrough performance improvement.

Download On Winning at Sea without Ships 20230919.

Fighting, Ukrainian Style: The Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative points to pending change in military organizations and industrial advantage.

The recent crash of a Russian warlord’s airplane is a reminder of the ubiquity of overhead surveillance: American intelligence thinks that the cause must have been an onboard bomb, because no missile launch was detected near Moscow. The full scope of that sort of overhead surveillance has enabled a Ukrainian style of warfare that relies heavily on highly dispersed, mobile infantry splendidly equipped with precision robotics. The Pentagon’s Replicator Initiative aims to duplicate some of that for the Americans, though perhaps with more robust and survivable weapons. Reforming fighting forces like 21st-century “Jock Columns” demands precision technology en masse, which suggests quicker program starts, faster learning curves, a shift in comparative advantage in military contracting, and less enthusiasm for horizontal mergers.

Read my four-page analysis here: Download On Fighting Ukrainian Style 20230829.

On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War: Moving militaries into the 21st Century may require alliances for marketing and manufacturing.

Anonymous opinions about the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War have been characterizing the military situation as stalemated. I assess that this whisper campaign is more designed to justify political decisions by the Biden Administration than to assess both the tactical situation and the broader technological dynamics of modern warfare. A more honest debate about what is possible and plausible in modern warfare, underway for several years, has been greatly informed by feedback from the front. Many 20th-century military systems are showing obsolescence because 21st-century surveillance and strike systems have been limiting their battlefield potential, inflicting high losses for little countervailing value. This in turn has been exposing the high costs and long production lead-times of the old-and-obvious.

The question for technologists and industrialists is whether the strategists will learn the relevant lessons, and how soon. The 21st century will unfold more slowly than some pundits predict, but more quickly than conservative military sentiments will allow. Fixing that problem will require vigorous marketing, and judicious timing in scaling manufacturing. Corporate alliances between emerging and established firms continue to offer an excellent way to solve that problem, and sometimes as far forward as Ukraine.

My full seven-page analysis is available here: Download On Learning Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War 20230825.

On Landmines: Consider criminalizing the mining of another country’s territory, and a prize competition for a truly automated approach for detection and destruction.

As the Ukrainian defense minister recently lamented, “Ukraine is the most heavily mined country in the world.” While his not-quite 6,000 sappers are hard at work scratching paths through Russian lines, actually clearing the country of explosives could take twenty years at its present pace. Few systematic solutions have emerged “left-of-boom,” beyond hand-held metal detectors and Bangalore torpedos, developed during the First World War. My research describes how matching better solutions to the problem requires providing policymakers with windows of opportunity for making the right decisions, which open lamentably infrequently. I offer two other ideas for advancing the cause against landmines: criminalizing the mining of another country’s territory, and a prize competition for a truly automated approach for detection and destruction.

My five-page analysis and policy proposal is available here: Download On Landmines 20230814.

Does skill, technology, or learning matter most in warfare? Recent battlefield evidence argues that industry should rethink old weapons, invest in simulations, and emphasize corporate agility.

Analysis of the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War continues to suggest answers to what matters most in warfare. As my friend Byron Callan likes to say, wars are audits; and to paraphrase Leon Trotsky, from time to time, another war gets interested in us. Militaries and their supporting industries should thus always want to know what inputs best predict victory. Then, in pursuit of a reasonable return and efficient processes, we should ask ask what industrial factors matter most for supporting that victory. To answer this question, I update an assessment I began in 2013 with new evidence from the Russo-Ukrainian War. I consider three possibilities in the literature, and offer three ideas about what to do:

1. If technology matters most, then manufacturers have strong arguments for new weapons—and new skills too.
2. If skill matters most, then the training & simulation industry has the best argument.
3. If learning matters most, then agility is an essential corporate quality for wartime contracting.

If indeed (3) is true, then, every arms manufacturer and military software developer with the financial means should have a team on the ground somewhere in Ukraine trying to learn what’s being learned, and critically, how to learn.

My four-page analysis is available here: Download On Skill Technology and Learning in Warfare 20230804.